哥萨克：俄罗斯准军事化的案例研究
Cossacks as a Case Study of Russia’s Paramilitarization
自2023年6月瓦格纳兵变以来，准军事组织在俄罗斯的角色一直受到密切关注。这些团体不仅代表着国家对暴力的垄断减少，从而增加了内战或军阀主义的可能性，而且还表明俄罗斯有能力在不诉诸另一项草案的情况下发动长期战争。这反过来又对战争持续流行这一看似矛盾的现象产生了影响：只要它不影响日常生活，就不太可能产生太大阻力。然而，这些团体的崛起并不是一夜之间发生的，直到现在，暴力准军事主义的地下浪潮才浮出水面。这份文件总结并扩展了之前提交给英国国防部下属的SONAC的一份报告，重点关注这些准军事组织中规模最大、影响最大的一个，即注册的俄罗斯哥萨克。注册的俄罗斯哥萨克如何说明正在进行的准军事化？
Since the Wagner mutiny of June 2023, the role of paramilitaries in Russia has become a subject of intense scrutiny. Not only do such groups represent a diminution of the state’s monopoly on violence—and so raise the possibility of civil war or warlordism—but they also speak to Russia’s ability to wage a long-term war without resorting to another draft. This, in turn, has implications for the seeming paradox of the war’s continued popularity: so long as it is not affecting daily life, it is unlikely to generate much resistance. Yet the rise of such groups has not occurred overnight, and it is only now that the subterranean stream of violent paramilitarism has risen to the surface. This memo summarizes and extends a report previously submitted to SONAC, part of the UK Ministry of Defence, focusing on perhaps the largest and most consequential of these paramilitary groups, the registered Russian Cossacks. How do the registered Russian Cossacks illustrate ongoing paramilitarization?
作者将准军事化定义为一个概念，它不仅仅是要求准军事部队在战场上充当部队。这一概念还包括那些为年轻人在军事结构中工作做准备的实体——在俄罗斯，这一过程明显带有性别色彩——无论是否是官方的。这包括表面上的教育演习、机构和比赛，以促进氛围军国主义，使社会为冲突做好准备。这一概念的两个方面对于解释俄罗斯军队在战场上的决心都很重要。本文将俄罗斯注册的哥萨克运动作为更大的准军事运动中这两种趋势的案例研究。
We define paramilitarization as a concept that goes beyond simply the demand for paramilitary forces to act as forces on the battlefield. The concept also includes those entities that prepare young men—and in the case of Russia, the process is distinctly gendered—to work in military structures, whether official or not. This includes ostensibly educational exercises, institutions, and competitions promoting an ambient militarism that steels society for conflict. Both dimensions of the concept are important to explaining the resolve of Russia’s forces in the field. This memo presents the Russian registered Cossack movement as a case study of both tendencies within the larger paramilitary movement.
The Registered Cossack Movement 注册的哥萨克运动
注册的哥萨克人是说明需求和供应因素的绝佳案例，既因为他们以鲜明的方式表现出这些倾向，也因为他们迄今为止被西方媒体所忽视。 鉴于2023年6月普里戈任的瓦格纳部队政变流产后对私人暴力使用者的兴趣，这种忽视更加令人惊讶。 然而，如图1所示，哥萨克人向俄罗斯侵略军提供了一些25000人的部队（考虑到离开和轮换）。 新闻报道称，今天俄罗斯有146000名注册的哥萨克人：不包括29000名学生和58000名60岁以上的成员，这使得60000人处于"黄金"战斗时代，使他们成为俄罗斯乌克兰最大的半自治武装编队。 同样，正在准备服役的29000学生证明哥萨克人如何履行准军事组织的供应方面。
The registered Cossacks are an excellent case to illustrate demand and supply factors, both because they exhibit these tendencies in stark fashion and because they have heretofore been ignored by the Western media. Given the interest in private users of violence after the abortive mutiny of Prigozhin’s Wagner forces in June 2023, this neglect is all the more surprising. Yet as Figure 1 demonstrates, the Cossacks have contributed some 25,000 troops to Russia’s invading forces (taking into account leaves and rotations). News articles state that there are 146,000 registered Cossacks in Russia today: excluding the 29,000 students and 58,000 members who are over the age of 60, that leaves 60,000 in “prime” fighting age, making them the largest semi-autonomous armed formation in Russia’s Ukraine venture of which this analyst is aware. Likewise, the 29,000 students who are being prepared for service testify to how the Cossacks fulfill the supply side of paramilitary organizations.
Figure 1. Number of Russian Cossacks fighting in the war since February 24, 2022
图1：自2022年2月24日以来参加战争的俄罗斯哥萨克人数
SOURCE: FIGURE COMPILED BY AUTHOR BASED ON DATA FROM THE ALL-RUSSIAN COSSACK SOCIETY. FOR DATA POINTS, SEE OCTOBER 13, 2022; DECEMBER 17, 2022; MARCH 23, 2023; APRIL 30, 2023; MAY 23, 2023; JUNE 7, 2023; JULY 17, 2023.
注册的哥萨克运动与后苏联时代的俄罗斯政权一起发展。 在共&产&主义结束时，在沙皇统治下存在的革命前的哥萨克大营的后代动员后，哥萨克人反对俄罗斯国家，并呼吁在北高加索建立自己的民族共和国。 甚至有人讨论了顿河地区基于其哥萨克遗产的自治权。 然而，用俄罗斯学者Olga Rvacheva的话说，这种关系"从对抗到合作"，1995建立了哥萨克登记册，根据该登记册，个人和组织可以注册执行国家服役。 登记册是哥萨克人的会计，如果国家要求，他们准备执行一些任务以换取付款。 虽然许多祖先的哥萨克人没有注册登记册，但人们可能会通过服役突然成为" 半哥萨克"（一个贬义词，质疑声称是哥萨克人的真实性）。 这些服役在2005年和2012年扩大，2018年政府成立了"全俄哥萨克社会"，集中了复盖俄罗斯联邦领土的12个voiskas（社团，大营或军队）。 这就是在乌克兰战斗的25000哥萨克志愿士兵的起源地，正是这些区域组织为青年安排教育活动。
The registered Cossack movement has evolved in tandem with the Russian regimes of the post-Soviet era. Upon their mobilization by descendants of the pre-revolutionary Cossack hosts that existed under the Tsar at the end of Communism, Cossacks opposed the Russian state and called for their own ethnic republic in the North Caucasus. There was even some discussion of autonomy for the Don region based on its Cossack heritage. The relationship, however, went “from confrontation to collaboration,” in the words of Russian scholar Olga Rvacheva, with the 1995 establishment of the Cossack register, under which individuals and organizations could sign up to perform state service. The register is an accounting of Cossacks who are ready, if called upon by the state, to perform a number of tasks in exchange for payment. While many ancestral Cossacks did not sign up to the register, one could suddenly become an “asphalt Cossack” (a derogatory term questioning the authenticity of the claim to be a Cossack) through service. Those services expanded in 2005 and 2012, and in 2018 the government established the “All-Russian Cossack Society,” which centralized the 12 voiskas (societies, hosts, or armies) that cover the territory of the Russian Federation. This is where the 25,000 Cossack volunteer soldiers fighting in Ukraine originated from, and it is those regional organizations that arrange educational activities for youth.
与此同时，战争正在进行的土地对那些自称是哥萨克的乌克兰人和俄罗斯人来说都有着特殊的意义。这体现了Arel和Driscoll（2022）将乌克兰危机描述为“俄罗斯世界内部的内战”。哥萨克原型对乌克兰民族身份的重要性有充分的证明。在莫斯科举行的一次哥萨克社会组织会议也强调了这片土地对俄罗斯哥萨克的重要性，将赫尔松、扎波罗热和第聂伯罗彼得罗夫斯克描述为“我们祖先鲜血浇灌的土地”，将俄罗斯的入侵描述为“圣战”，莫斯科支持并鼓励准军事部队的未来发展。
At the same time, the lands where the war is being fought hold a special meaning for those—both Ukrainian and Russian—who claim to be Cossacks. This exemplifies Arel and Driscoll’s (2022) description of the Ukraine crisis as a “civil war within the Russian-speaking world.” The importance of the Cossack archetype for Ukrainian national identity is well-documented. A meeting in Moscow of social Cossack organizations underlined the importance of the land for Russian Cossacks as well, describing Kherson, Zaporizhzhiya, and Dnipropetrovsk as “the land watered by the blood of our ancestors” and Russia’s invasion as a “holy war.” In harnessing such para-state organizations to serve its own ends, Moscow embraces and encourages the future development of paramilitaries.
Demand for Cossack Volunteer Fighters 哥萨克志愿战士的需求
在2022年9月的第一轮军事动员之后，当俄罗斯迫使300000名男子服兵役时，克里姆林宫一直不愿意发起第二轮动员，并且不太可能在2024年总统大选之前这样做。"可以肯定的是，前线需要更多的人，这导致了增加俄罗斯军队人力的创造性计划。 我们已经习惯于看到俄罗斯军人拖网监狱的视频，并悬挂减刑的前景以换取服役，但一个被低估的机制是BARS系统。 BARS（Boevoi Armeiskii Rezerv Strany，特种作战陆军预备役）是一种类似于美国陆军预备役或英国领土军队的预备役系统。 该系统招募男子，其中许多人来自最贫穷地区，并为他们提供丰厚的薪水参加敌对行动。 这些薪水在BARS网站上做广告，但有报道说，很少有薪水按报道支付—而且有时根本没有支付。 例如，来自BARS-5的叶甫根尼在乌克兰战斗了两个月，并被承诺为410000卢布。 他声称只收到了32000卢布多一点。 其他各种可疑的"错误"，如拼写错误名称和"丢失"银行详细信息，也导致未支付承诺的工资。
Following the initial round of mobilization in September 2022, when Russia forced 300,000 men into military service, the Kremlin has been reluctant to launch a second round and is unlikely to do so in advance of the 2024 presidential “election.” To be sure, more men are needed at the front, which has led to creative schemes to increase the manpower of Russia’s army. We are already used to seeing videos of Russian military men trawling prisons and dangling the prospect of commuted sentences in exchange for service, but one underreported mechanism has been the BARS system. BARS (Boevoi Armeiskii Rezerv Strany, Special Combat Army Reserve) is a reserve system akin to the United States Army Reserve or the British Territorial Army. The system recruits men, many from the poorest regions, and offers them a lucrative salary to participate in hostilities. The salaries are advertised on the BARS website, but reports say that few salaries are paid as reported—and they are sometimes not paid at all. For instance, Yevgeny from BARS-5 fought in Ukraine for two months and was promised 410,000 rubles. He claims only to have received a little more than 32,000 rubles. A variety of other questionable “mistakes,” such as misspelling names and “losing” bank details, have also led to non-payment of promised salaries.
同样，BARS网站承诺进行专业培训，官方媒体报道称，“BARS分遣队的培训由845名具有当代作战经验的军事教官在八个训练场进行。”然而，其他报道表明，实际提供的培训不足，设备不符合标准。在BARS注册服兵役的个人与国防部签订了合同，但他们的法律地位并不明确。合同双方是“志愿者”和“管理层”，文件中没有提到任何法律实体。虽然从技术上讲，新兵并没有违反《刑法》第359条（“关于雇佣军”）或第208条（关于参与非法武装团体），因为他们是为了俄罗斯的利益而战，但人权律师谢尔盖-克里文科声称，BARS营相当于“国防部创建的非法武装团体”。
Likewise, the BARS website promises professional training and state media report that “the training of the BARS detachments is being carried out at eight training grounds by 845 military instructors with modern combat experience.” However, other reports suggest that the training actually given has been insufficient and the equipment sub-standard. Individuals who register for military service with BARS sign contacts with the Ministry of Defense, but their legal status is murky. The parties to the contract are “Volunteer” and “Management,” and no legal entities are named in the document. While recruits are not technically in violation of Article 359 (“On Mercenaries”) or Article 208 of the Criminal Code (On Participation in Illegal Armed Groups) because they are fighting in the interests of Russia, human rights lawyer Sergey Krivenko has claimed that the BARS battalions amount to “the creation of illegal armed groups by the Ministry of Defense.”
很难确定在乌克兰战斗的两个营的数量，但其中一些肯定是由哥萨克人组成的，他们可以用哥萨克符号命名他们的营，作为一种特殊的特权。 因此，国营（"注册"）哥萨克运动在俄罗斯准军事化的需求方面发挥着重要作用。 该计划于2021年首次由国防部宣布，到2022年11月30日，据报道有20个这样的BARS单位。 最近的谣言表明，多达32个BARS单位现在正在运作，至少有三个来自卢甘茨克LNR和顿涅茨克DNR的军队。 该分析员所知道的最新单位是BARS-32单位，由来自扎波罗热州的志愿者组成。 在这些32个旅中，至少有18个由"哥萨克人"组成，他们甚至在入侵之前就注册了国家服役。 按地区划分，三个营来自克拉斯诺达尔地区（库班），三个来自斯塔夫罗波尔（特雷克），两个来自罗斯托夫（顿河），一个来自克里米亚（黑海），一个来自奥伦堡，一个来自伏尔加，一个来自普里莫尔斯基（乌苏里斯基），一个来自外贝加尔地区，另一个来自俄罗斯和国外哥萨克战斗机联盟（截至2023年6月7日）。还有迹象表明，俄罗斯人正在利用哥萨克思想在乌克兰南部的流行，招募乌克兰公民为俄罗斯而战，就像第聂伯营一样。虽然这些新兵中的许多人，甚至可能是大多数人，在战前都是哥萨克组织的成员，但也可能有一些人加入哥萨克组织是为了志愿服役。因此，以前的社会激进组织正在被征召入伍。然而，正如下一节所展示的那样，他们也在努力为未来的军事冒险创造新兵供应。
It is difficult to be certain of the number of BARS battalions fighting in Ukraine, but some of them are definitely staffed by Cossacks who get to name their battalions with Cossack symbols as a special privilege. The state-run (“registered”) Cossack movement thus plays an important role in the demand side of paramilitarization in Russia. The program was first announced by the Ministry of Defense in 2021 and by November 30, 2022, there were reportedly 20 such BARS units. Recent rumors suggest that as many as 32 BARS units are now in operation, with at least three coming from the armies of the LNR and the DNR. The most recent unit of which this analyst is aware is the BARS-32 unit, constituted by volunteers from the region of Zaporozhzhia. Of these 32 brigades, at least 18 are made up of “Cossacks” who signed up for state service even prior to the invasion. By region, three battalions are from the Krasnodar region (Kuban), three from Stavropol (Terek), two from Rostov (Don), one from Crimea (Black Sea), one from Orenburg, one from the Volga and Orenburg, one from Primorskii (Ussuriskii), one from the Trans-Baikal region, and one from the Union of Cossack Fighters of Russia and Abroad (as of June 7, 2023). There are also signs that the Russians are using the popularity of the Cossack idea in Southern Ukraine to recruit Ukrainian citizens to fight for Russia, as in the case of the Dnepr battalion. While many, possibly even most, of these recruits were members of Cossack organizations prior to the war, it is probably also true that some have enlisted in Cossack structures expressly to volunteer. Thus, erstwhile social-militant organizations are being drafted into official military service. Yet as the next section demonstrates, they also work to create a supply of recruits for future military ventures.
Supply of New Recruits for Paramilitarization 准军事化新兵的供应
“准军事化”的概念也包含了可以被描述为供应方动态的东西。这指的是主要为年轻人参军做准备。所谓准备，我们指的是旨在确保年轻人达到必要的军事准备水平的身体挑战和心理（或“精神”）准备。这些主要通过哥萨克学员团、更广泛的教育课程和体育比赛提供，包括展示军事力量的比赛。由于军事荣耀的框架加强了长期冲突的决心，监护对社会的影响也难以衡量。
The concept of “paramilitarization” also contains what might be described as a supply-side dynamic. This refers to the preparation of primarily young men for participation in the military. By preparation, we mean both physical challenges designed to ensure young men achieve the requisite level of military readiness and psychological (or “spiritual”) preparation. These are primarily provided through the Cossack Cadet Corps, broader educational classes, and sports competitions, including those demonstrating martial strength. There is also a hard-to-measure tutelary effect on society, as frames of military glory strengthen resolve for a long conflict.
哥萨克学员团（俄语缩写KKK）是一个独立于学校的机构，学校在不同的教育模式下履行常规的教学职能。根据全俄哥萨克协会长期（现在是前）哥萨克盖特曼和现任杜马代表尼古拉·多卢达的说法， “正如奥伦堡地区所建议的那样，在多学科的教育机构中进行全面的哥萨克学员教育是不可能的。‘哥萨克部分’预设了一个完全不同的制度、不同的教育过程组织和团队中的不同关系。哥萨克教官是这里的必备人物主要教育计划的脉动纪律、儿童的爱国主义教育、他们对哥萨克戒律的了解和遵守，以及对什么是哥萨克荣誉、什么是哥萨克兄弟情谊、什么是对祖国的服役的认识，也是至关重要的。”
The Cossack Cadet Corps (Russian acronym KKK) is a separate institution from schools, which carry out regular pedagogical functions under a different model of education. According to longtime (now former) Cossack ataman of the All-Russian Cossack Society and current Duma deputy Nikolai Doluda, “It is impossible to carry out a full-fledged Cossack cadet education in a multidisciplinary educational institution, as is proposed by the Orenburg region. The ‘Cossack component’ presupposes a completely different regime, a different organization of the educational process, and different relationships in the team. A Cossack mentor is an obligatory figure here. Along with mastering the compulsory disciplines of the main educational program, the patriotic education of children, their knowledge and observance of Cossack commandments and awareness of what Cossack honor is, what Cossack brotherhood is, what service to the Motherland is, are also paramount.”
共有31个哥萨克学员团。阿斯特拉罕、布良斯克、库尔干、莫斯科、新西伯利亚、奔萨、萨马拉、卡尔梅基亚、彼尔姆、斯塔夫罗波尔和斯维尔德洛夫斯克各有一个。沃罗涅日、伏尔加格勒和卢甘斯克各有两个哥萨克学员团组织。罗斯托夫有六个该组织，克拉斯诺达尔有七个。有具体计划在斯塔夫罗波尔、哈巴罗夫斯克、外贝加尔、克拉斯诺亚尔斯克、伊尔库茨克、鄂木斯克和奥伦堡地区开设新的哥萨克学员团组织，使哥萨克学员团主要成为一种地区现象。尽管人们可以想象这些组织之间的规模会有一些变化，但平均报名人数似乎在500人左右。
There are a total of 31 Cossack Cadet Corps. Astrakhan, Bryansk, Kurgan, Moscow, Novosibirsk, Penza, Samara, Kalmykia, Penza, Perm, Stavropol, and Sverdlovsk each have one. There are two KKK organizations in each of Voronezh, Volgograd, and Luhansk. Rostov has six organizations and Krasnodar seven. There are concrete plans to open new KKK organizations in Stavropol, Khabarovsk, Trans-Baikal, Krasnoyarsk, Irkutsk, Omsk, and Orenburg regions—making the KKK primarily a regional phenomenon. Although one imagines some variation in size between these organizations, the average appears to be around 500 enrollees.
这些哥萨克学员团组织相互举行友谊赛。 一个让年轻的"哥萨克人"相互对抗的比赛是"最佳哥萨克课程"的称号。"根据公告，比赛分三轮，团队规模为14名11-16岁的学生。 在网上举行的第一轮比赛中，参加者可选择"哥萨克博物馆"、"哥萨克全能者"和"传统守护者"等类别；得分最高的20支球队进入第二轮。 同样，"俄罗斯哥萨克青年联盟"参加了"准备工作和防御"（GTO）计划，这是一个苏联时代的遗物，已经复活。 年轻人可以获得GTO的徽章，旨在通过参与哥萨克组织来灌输哥萨克将军尼古拉·多卢达(Nikolai Doluda)所描述的"对健康生活方式，身体改善和准备成为未来祖国有价值的捍卫者的渴望"。 这种准军事活动为年轻的俄罗斯人在精神上和身体上准备进入军队或其他军事相邻的机构。
These KKK organizations hold friendly competitions against each other. One competition that pits young “Cossacks” against each other is for the title of “Best Cossack Class.” According to the announcement, the competition has three rounds and team size is 14 students aged 11-16. In the first round, held online, participants choose between the categories of “Cossack Museum,” “Cossack All-Rounder,” and “Guardian of Tradition;” the 20 teams with the highest number of points advance to round two. Similarly, “the Union of Cossack Youth of Russia” participates in the “Ready for Work and Defense” (GTO) program, a Soviet-era relic that has been revived. Young people can earn their insignia for the GTO, designed to inculcate what Nikolai Doluda describes as “a desire for a healthy lifestyle, physical improvement and readiness to become a worthy defender of their Fatherland in the future,” through participation in Cossack organizations. Such quasi-martial activities prepare young Russians both mentally and physically for recruitment into the army or other military-adjacent structures.
在地区层面，也有一个确定最有前途的征聘人员的过程。2023年9月，全俄斯巴达人和哥萨克闪电战在奥伦堡地区的萨摩多沃村举行。哥萨克闪电战采用了几种竞赛测试的形式：童子军条纹，由军事应用运动（包括国际象棋、迷你足球和训练）的比赛组成；哥萨克铁人三项团体赛，年轻男子参加跑步、剑割葡萄和射击训练；以及哥萨克歌曲比赛“在篝火上”。这些过多的比赛有助于确保哥萨克预备队的身体准备。
At the regional level, too, there is a process through which the most promising recruits are identified. The all-Russian Spartakiade and the Cossack Flash competition took place in the village of Samordovo, Orenburg region, in September 2023. Cossack Flash takes the form of several competitive tests: Scout’s Stripe, made up of competitions in military-applied sports (including chess, mini-football, and drill training); the team competition Cossack Triathlon, in which young men compete in running, cutting vines with a sword, and fire training; and the Cossack song contest “At the Campfire.” This plethora of competitions help ensure the physical readiness of the Cossack reserve.
此外，俄罗斯各地正在建立哥萨克教育体系。现有的哥萨克幼儿园和学校正在接受大学级别的培训。从出于安全原因无法透露身份的直接来源，作者可以证明在全国范围内扩大哥萨克大学教育（包括研究生学位）的计划。这种教育使未来的哥萨克具备了价值观，并越来越多地接受了参军的训练。
In addition, a system of Cossack education is being constructed throughout Russia. Existing Cossack kindergartens and schools are being supplemented with university-level training. From direct sources whose identity cannot be revealed for safety reasons, I can attest to plans to expand Cossack university education (including in the form of postgraduate degrees) across the entire country. Such education equips would-be Cossacks with the values and, increasingly, the training to go into the military.
2023年，第一批学士学位学生进入拉祖莫夫斯基莫斯科国立技术与管理大学（第一哥萨克大学）。该学位有四个专业：新闻、行政、教学和畜牧业。他们遵循的课程结合了“古典人道主义教育与实践和应用学科，以及关于哥萨克历史和文化的单独板块”。哥萨克当局在一项名为“为祖国服务的哥萨克”的比赛中一如既往地为大学生提供奖品一篇帖子显示，俄罗斯现在有“15所‘哥萨克’大学”，指的是那些在下一学年共招收了800名学生参加专门以哥萨克为主题的项目的大学。这些课程和相关活动的标题足以说明俄罗斯青年的准军事化。
The first cohort of Bachelor’s degree students enrolled in Razumovsky Moscow State University of Technology and Management (the First Cossack University) in 2023. The degree has four specializations: journalism, administration, teaching, and animal husbandry. The curriculum they follow combines “classical humanitarian education with practical and applied disciplines, as well as a separate block on the history and the culture of the Cossacks.” True to form, the Cossack authorities offer university students prizes in a competition titled “Cossacks in Service of the Fatherland.” One post suggests that there are now “15 ‘Cossack’ universities” in Russia, referring to those universities that have recruited a total of 800 students into specifically Cossack-themed programs for the upcoming academic year. The titles of such courses and associated activities suffice to illustrate the paramilitarization of Russian youth.
Conclusion 结论
哥萨克在俄罗斯的活动是对该国正在进行的“准军事化”的一个案例研究。所谓的“半哥萨克”（对不真实哥萨克的嘲讽）机构既为俄罗斯冲突中的男子提供服役，包括“特别军事行动”，也为年轻人的未来服役做好身心准备。通过这种方式，哥萨克既满足了准军事化的需求，又满足了准国家实体的供应。值得注意的是，虽然哥萨克只是履行这一职能的几个组织之一，但他们似乎构建了一个比作者所知的其他组织更全面、更发达的机构网络。也许这是该地区土著哥萨克人口持续存在的结果，这可能会使原型更加真实和吸引人。
Cossack activities in Russia are a case study of the country’s ongoing “paramilitarization.” So-called “asphalt Cossack” (a mocking term for inauthentic Cossacks) institutions both provide men for service in Russia’s conflicts—including the “special military operation”—and prepare youth physically and mentally for future service. In this way, the Cossacks fulfill both the demand and supply sides of paramilitarization, doing so in a way that constructs para-state entities. Notably, while the Cossacks are only one of several organizations performing this function, they appear to have constructed a more comprehensive and developed web of institutions than the other cases of which I am aware. Perhaps this is a consequence of the persistence of indigenous Cossack populations in the region, which may make the archetype more authentic and appealing.
Richard Arnold is Associate Professor of Political Science at Muskingum University and a regular contributor to the Jamestown Foundation’s Eurasia Daily Monitor. His research interests focus on paramilitarization, sport, nationalism, and the Cossack movement in Russia and Ukraine.
DECEMBER 20, 2023
RICHARD ARNOLD
https://www.ponarseurasia.org/cossacks-as-a-case-study-of-russias-paramilitarization/
